which received hardly any attention at all. Commentators debated whether the methods of coercive interrogation violated a domestic statute banning torture but paid little attention to the Convention Against Torture. 7 What accounts for these differences? One factor is that most foreign critics rejected the premise that the United States was at war with Al Qaeda. If the United States and Al Qaeda were not at war, then the Geneva Conventions did not come into play. Restrictions on U.S. treatment of Al Qaeda could come only from international human rights law. But if that factor explains why foreigners focused on human rights law, it does not explain why criticism based on the laws of war received more attention in the United States than criticism based on human rights law.
In this paper, I argue that this difference is connected with the structure of international law. At the heart of international law lies the phenomenon of reciprocity. States take international law norms most seriously when the penalty for violating them is direct and immediate retaliation from other states in the form of reciprocal violation of the same norms.
When international law has this structure, it is relatively robust. When it lacks this structure, it is weak. I argue that the United States takes the law of war more seriously than human rights law because the laws of war are reciprocally enforced, while human rights laws are not. There is a further twist to this story in the context of the conflict with Al Qaeda. Because the United States had no reason to believe that Al Qaeda (or any other organization or country) would retaliate if the United States violated the laws of war in the conflict with Al Qaeda, it did not permit itself to be constrained by those laws. This is why even the heightened concern about the Geneva Conventions resulted in only partial compliance with them-and why the United States disregarded the laws of war in the conflict with Al Qaeda while largely complying with them (albeit with notable exceptions) in the simultaneous conflict with Iraq.
In Part I of this paper, I argue that the laws of war are enforced through reciprocity; where reciprocity fails, violations occur. In part II, I argue that human rights treaties are not enforced through reciprocity. Those treaties are best understood as efforts to overcome a collective action problem on the part of a subset of liberal states, efforts that have largely failed, albeit with some important exceptions. In part III, I further draw out the differences between the two approaches by comparing their embodiment in international organizations. In part IV, I return to U.S. policy in its conflict with Al Qaeda. 
I. The Laws of War
International humanitarian law, also known variously as the laws of war and jus in bello, limits the methods, tactics, and activities of each side in a war. Rules require, among many others things, that prisoners of war and civilians in occupied territory be treated humanely; that the lives and property of citizens of neutral states be respected; and that reasonable force be used against targets. Hospitals and cultural sites cannot be attacked. Enemy soldiers accused of war crimes must be given fair trials. Military forces must keep order and supply public services in occupied areas. Truces must be respected. 8 Another set of rules governs the types of weapons that can be used, forbidding dum-dum bullets, certain types of fragmentary explosives, blinding lasers, poison gas, and other weapons believed to be inhumane.
9
Laws of war have always existed. In earlier times, they governed siege and the exchange of hostages, as well as the treatment of civilians and captured soldiers. Up until the twentieth century, states understood that violation of the laws of war would be met with retaliation. If one belligerent slaughters POWs, then the other belligerent would respond by slaughtering its own prisoners. If one belligerent ignored the rules of siege, the other belligerent would as well. 10 In the twentieth century, however, states agreed that reprisals would be limited. 11 With a few exceptions, states were no longer permitted to inflict collective punishment on the enemy.
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Retaliation was limited and legalized. States could capture enemy soldiers responsible for war crimes, give them a fair trial, and punish them if they were convicted.
The laws of war have a simple economic explanation. When two states go to war, they foresee an endpoint, which will typically involve certain concessions by one state-the transfer of territory, monetary reparations, etc. Given that both states will end up at some new equilibrium in terms of territory or wealth or power, it is best for both states if they can reach that are better off if they both refrain from using harsh tactics than if they both use harsh tactics. For example, each state does better by (for example) killing enemy prisoners than incurring the cost of sheltering and feeding them, but both states are better off if POWs are protected than if they are killed. 13 The problem of harsh tactics has the structure of the familiar prisoner's dilemma, and can be solved through repeated play. The particular norms of jus in bello can be understood as descriptions of the equilibrium outcomes; they provide focal points that minimize the risk that cooperation breaks down because states misinterpret each other's actions.
14 Note that the law does not constrain states in the same way that domestic law constrains citizens-through third- In the twentieth century, advances in the mechanization of warfare and the professionalization of armies rendered irrelevant old rules governing siege, prize, neutrality, and related matters. 16 World War I saw extensive violation of these out-dated rules. Yet certain basic norms, such as the humane treatment of POWs, were respected. In World War II, these rules were respected on the western front but not on the eastern front. Their collapse on the eastern front can be attributed to long supply lines and the massive number of prisoners who were taken-both of these factors made it extremely costly to hold POWs in humane conditions. The Nazis also regarded Russians as subhuman, and where one side launches a total war, the other side has no reason to respect the laws of war. Similar factors may explain violations of the laws of war by all sides in the Pacific theater. 17 In the numerous post-World War II wars, the laws of war were respected on an ad hoc basis. POWs were often but not always mistreated; poison gas was used in the Egypt-Yemen and Iran-Iraq Wars, but not in the others. A prominent casualty was the entire law of occupation, which no state ever acknowledged as a binding legal obligation 15 As does statistical evidence; see Morrow, When Do States, supra. Morrow also finds that democracies are more likely to comply with the laws of war than are authoritarian states, which is orthogonal to my argument. 16 For an excellent account focusing on neutrality, see Stephen C. Neff, The Rights and Duties of Neutrals (2000). The book emphasizes the fluidity of the laws of neutrality over all of naval history, not just the twentieth century. 17 For additional evidence, see sources cited in supra note __.
until the second Iraq War. 18 One possible explanation is that occupation is the end game; the occupier no longer fears retaliation by the defeated or nearly defeated enemy.
It should be clear that reprisal never really went away, at least in the broad sense that nations did not regard themselves as bound to laws of war that their enemies violated. Why not?
One hypothesis is that the restrictions on reprisals, if obeyed, prevent belligerents from effectively retaliating when the other side violates the laws of war. The threat of prosecution of war criminals is insufficient to deter violations because the probability that soldiers are captured and tried is low. The law tries to address this problem by giving military superiors a legal obligation to try and punish subordinates who violate the law of war. But enemy states have no legal way to retaliate if the superiors fail to take this action-aside from taking diplomatic and economic countermeasures not prohibited by international law. The superior faces a sanction only in the unlikely event that he or she is captured by the enemy. But, unlike an ordinary soldier, the superior will usually be far behind enemy lines. 19 In order to deter law-of-war violations, or to avoid being put at a disadvantage if they are not deterrable, belligerents acted in reciprocal fashion rather than comply with the law.
In sum, reciprocity both explains why the laws of war are self-enforcing, and their limits.
Rules that make states jointly better off in one war but not in another war may be respected in the first war but will not be respected in the second. Rules that make states jointly better off in one theater but not another will also be respected in only the first theater. When the conditions for reciprocity fail-as the war nears its end, when one belligerent does not have sufficient institutional structure-the laws of war will not be respected. Finally, the laws regulating reprisals failed because they interfered with the only effective mechanism for ensuring that the laws were self-enforcing.
II. Human Rights
The modern international human rights regime began with the Universal Declaration of and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Genocide Convention, and the Convention Against Torture. The ICCPR recognized a standard list of political and civil rights akin to those in the United States Bill of Rights, while the ICESCR created rights to work, social security, health care, and the like. Other treaties protected children, prohibited discrimination against women, minorities, and disabled people, and established other rights.
Two schools of thought have arisen about the human rights treaties. The first holds that human rights are moral universals, and the treaties, by incorporating human rights into law, require states to abide by universal ideals. This school of thought draws on a long philosophical and political tradition in the west, and continues to have considerable rhetorical and political power, but it has foundered on philosophical disagreements about the nature of morality. Modern moral philosophy has repudiated natural law thinking, the enterprise of deriving universal moral ideals from human nature or the human condition.
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The second school of thought sees human rights treaties as serving political purposes.
These "agreement theories," as Charles Beitz calls them, emphasize that human rights treaties are law. 21 States make law only when it serves their interests; therefore, human rights treaties must serve their interest. According to agreement theories, human rights norms are simply those on which all (or nearly all) governments can agree, reflecting the lowest common denominator among their moral and political systems. If one state respects norms A, B, and C, while another state respects norms C, D, and E, then only C can be regarded as a norm of human rights.
Neither approach quite captures the way that the idea of human rights plays out in political and legal discussion. The first approach draws on international morality, but international law rests on the consent of states and rejects appeals to morality. Because international morality is highly contested, states prefer to rely on agreement as a basis for international cooperation. The second approach, however, cannot account for the actual content of international human rights treaties, which include many norms that are not universal. It also assumes a puzzling scenario in which states commit only to comply norms that they already observe; what is the point of that? When states criticize each other for violating human rights treaties, their debates often touch on profound disagreements about the content of human rights norms.
The starting point for understanding international human rights law is the recognition that the norms contained in human rights treaties do not in fact reflect an overlapping consensus-at least if the human rights treaties are interpreted, as they normally are by western commentators, as requiring norms of liberal democracy plus possibly a number of positive rights to medical care, work, and the like. 22 Developing states give priority, in varying degrees, to economic growth, traditional values, and political order. We need a different approach to understanding how human rights law might work.
Assume that states have preferences over a range of outcomes, which can include altruistic as well as conventionally self-interested outcomes. 23 The preferences of states reflect the preferences of the general population, interest groups, or elites, as they emerge through political institutions. If these groups care about the well-being of people in other countries, then their preferences will be reflected in part in the state's. More formally, consider a timeline in which (1) Zimbabwe chooses to respect human rights norms (which is costly) or not, (2) the United States chooses to punish Zimbabwe at some cost to itself or not to, and (3) the European Union chooses to punish Zimbabwe at some cost to itself or not to. In a one-shot version of this game with discrete actions, the European Union would refuse to punish, the United States would refuse to punish, and Zimbabwe would violate the norms. As discussed in the text, in a repeated version of the game, an equilibrium in which the United States and the European Union cooperate, and Zimbabwe respects human rights norms, is possible. Zimbabwe continues to torture, then the United States and the European Union must cut off benefits. Otherwise, Zimbabwe has no incentive to stop torturing its citizens.
As is always the case, there are multiple equilibria. In one equilibrium, Zimbabwe does not respect human rights because the United States and the European Union are not able to cooperate in sanctioning it. In another equilibrium, Zimbabwe respects human right because the United States and the European Union cooperate in sanctioning it. One can also imagine alternatives: for example, the United States and the European Union cannot cooperate but each does discipline Zimbabwe unilaterally if Zimbabwe fails to respect human rights. Their independent efforts will be less than their coordinated efforts, so Zimbabwe's improvement will be less as well.
There are three reasons for being skeptical about the equilibrium in which Zimbabwe's human rights behavior improves. First, the United States and the European Union may not be able to cooperate. In the real world outside our example, the rich states number in the dozens, and as the number of parties increases, cooperation becomes more difficult. In addition, states frequently disagree about when a human rights violator should be sanctioned, in part because the states have different interests that they balance against the gains from improvement in human Second, the human rights violator itself may not be able to cooperate with the countries that seek to change its behavior. Recall that cooperation requires a low discount rate. For countries, this means political institutions that take account of future payoffs. But many human rights violators have weak institutional capacity. Elected officials face coups; authoritarian leaders act arbitrarily; bureaucracies are corrupt and cannot constrain leaders. In many cases, the government has little power over local officials who commit human rights violations. In extreme cases, such as Somalia, the government collapses and anarchy prevails.
Third, the United States and the European Union can compel Zimbabwe to improve human rights only if they can credibly threaten to sanction Zimbabwe if it fails to do so.
However, threats to sanction are not always credible. Sanctions typically harm ordinary people more than they harm leaders; indeed, sanctions work mainly by impelling ordinary people to overthrow the government. They can do so only by causing pain to ordinary people. However, the humanitarian impulse that causes rich states to pressure poor states to enter human rights treaties also makes it difficult for them to follow through and punish the population, already poor and miserable, if their country does not comply with the treaty. This problem has been dubbed the Samaritan's Dilemma.
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It should also be kept in mind that liberal countries rarely have a strong interest in improving well-being in other countries. The governments of liberal countries stay in power by providing benefits to voters, not to foreigners. Thus, governments give aid to foreigners only when doing so benefits voters. This can happen for two reasons. First, voters care about the wellbeing of foreigners. No doubt they do, but it is equally clear that the well-being of foreigners is a low priority for most people. 28 Second, voters care about security and prosperity, and providing help to foreigners advance these goals. Although sometimes it does, liberal governments have discovered that they often do better along these dimensions by providing support to illiberal states when they are strategically or economically important. . Simmons' book is the most recent and celebrated of this work, and some people have taken from it the message that the earlier literature was unduly pessimistic. But Simmons' results are similar to that of earlier work: the overall effect of human rights treaties is either nil or very small; even if transitional states are isolated, the effect is small (the coefficients in her regressions), and it is not clear why human rights treaties should be evaluated on the basis of their effect on a subset of states. 31 One other empirical finding is that the transitional states do improve some of their human rights behavior when they enter treaties, unlike democratic and authoritarian states. The simplest explanation for this pattern is that states undergoing transition both independently improve their treatment of citizens and ratify human rights treaties to signal commitment to the new regime. Thus, the independent effect of the treaty ratification on human rights is open to question. Many transitional states are western, suggesting that people in those states have human rights preferences that are independent of treaty obligations. countries interpret human rights so that they are consistent with Islamic law, which means that they reject human rights norms that require equal rights for women, that prohibit certain harsh criminal punishments, and insist on robust religious toleration. China and other developing countries advance the "right to development," which excuses them from respecting political rights that interfere with economic growth. 33 There is no way to resolve these disagreements; it is better to recognize that there are shifting human rights coalitions that advance largely (but not entirely) different core values.
III. Institutions: A Comparison
One of the striking differences between human rights law and the laws of war is the One might expect international institutions that are established and operated by states to have more power than private institutions, or that a highly institutionalized area of international law would be more successful than a thinly institutionalized area of international law. But the opposite is true. What accounts for this puzzling fact? The answer is that states established the human rights institutions to overcome a collective action problem, while the ICRC fits into the simple logic of reciprocity that undergirds the laws of war. The ICRC inserts itself between the two belligerents at war, giving each a method to monitor the behavior of the other. The states now have a commitment to permit the ICRC to meet POWs (among other things), and each state will retaliate against the other state if it violates this commitment. The system can work as long as the ICRC is committed to neutrality. Why exactly the members of the ICRC maintain those commitments is not obvious, but a likely explanation is that the ICRC will cease to have any function as soon as states stop trusting it. Its members will have to look for employment elsewhere.
34 For a description of its history, structure, and functions, see Bugnion, supra.
Human rights institutions face a more difficult environment. The basic problem is that the collective action problem that afflicts enforcement of human rights treaties also interferes, in a second-order way, with attempts to create institutions to enforce or advance human rights.
Consider a group of states that enter a human rights treaty and also seek to establish an institution that will monitor compliance with the treaty. The institution or agency must be staffed by people chosen by the states, people who, by necessity, are given a certain degree of discretion-to set an agenda, to allocate resources to fact-finding, to evaluate the facts. The agency could be established as a court or as a committee or other institution; for current purposes, its particular form does not matter. The states grant authority to the agency to evaluate compliance.
Any grant of authority gives rise to agency costs. In our case, we might suppose that the "principal"-the group of states-have some particular goal, namely, the enforcement of the provisions of the human rights treaties. There may be more or less consensus about this goal;
often vague language is used to paper over differences. The agent obtains power from its ability to set the agenda, and its private information-the facts that it learns about as it evaluates member states.
The agent is a collectivity as well; it will typically consist of delegates from the member states. States must appoint delegates, and it will not always be possible to find people whose preferences perfectly align with those of the appointing states. There is also the problem that states' human rights preferences may change over time as governments are replaced. Finally, aggregating preferences always involves some arbitrariness, with a great deal depending on institutional design (for example, majority rule versus a consensus rule). For all these reasons, the preferences of the agent are likely to diverge considerably from the preferences of the principal.
The usual solution to agency problems is not available for international human rights institutions. In business settings, principals can provide appropriate incentives to agents by paying them more when agents succeed and less when they fail. Stock options, bonus pay, and similar mechanisms can be used. But these mechanisms require an objective method for evaluating the agents' performance when the agents' actual activities are invisible to the principal. If the principal cannot observe whether the agent works hard or not, at least the principal can observe the revenues that flow in. This is not the case for international human rights institutions. When a human rights committee issues reports, it is difficult to evaluate them without duplicating the effort, which would create new agency problems. Nor is there some independent and objective measure that can be used to evaluate their performance.
Even when human rights organizations serve as perfect agents, they have no ability to compel their principals to obey their judgments. Here, we see the collective action problem again. If a human rights organization directs Zimbabwe to change its treatment of political prisoners, and Zimbabwe refuses to do so, only other nation states can punish it. Yet other states prefer to free ride, and so the sanction is likely to be weak or nonexistent.
For all these reasons, states have been reluctant to give human rights agencies authority to issue binding legal judgments. Even where states agree on a particular human rights goal, they cannot trust the agency to pursue it. Even when they can trust the agency, the states themselves The ECtHR is a regional institution, not an international institution, and it no doubt derives much of its power from the fact that most of its members belong to the EU and most of the remaining members want to belong to the EU. This sets it apart from the other international human rights institutions, which have had little impact on the behavior of states. The reason, as I have emphasized, is that they cannot overcome the collective action problem and states' weak interests in the well-being of people in other states.
In sum, the ICRC is an effective institution because its role is consistent with the logic of reciprocity that underlies the laws of war. The human rights organizations exist in a much less favorable strategic environment. Constructed to overcome a collective action problem, but themselves subject to the same collective action problem, they have no room for maneuver. Geneva Conventions and possible retaliatory mistreatment of American soldiers, in this war or in future wars. 38 The U.S. government did not fear that Al Qaeda would retaliate against Americans as a consequence of torture because Al Qaeda already disregarded every type of humanitarian norm, and groups like it in future will as well.
The distinction makes some sense from a rational choice perspective. 39 It also recalls the history of the laws of war, and the many exceptions made when states battle non-state organizations. A state gains nothing by complying with international law when there is no reciprocity-and this is what undermined compliance with both human rights law and the laws of war in the conflict with Al Qaeda. The case for complying with the laws of war, I have argued, is stronger than the case for complying with human rights law.
There is, however, a further twist, which is that it is unclear whether the United States There is a possible argument that disregarding human rights law has harmed U.S.
reputation in a more general sense. 40 The question is whether a country's violation of some law X will cause other countries to believe that the first country will violate some other law Y that supports cooperation that the first country values. 41 
Conclusion
Reciprocity has always been at the heart of international law. States create international law for the sake of reciprocal gains, and they comply with international law so that those gains are not lost. The logic of reciprocity can be understood using simple game theoretical models, which show that it is the key to self-enforcement in the repeated bilateral prisoner's dilemma.
But if reciprocity can support certain forms of international cooperation, it also puts a limit on how much international cooperation can accomplish. The logic of reciprocity suggests that international law will be most robust when states cooperate in pairs or in small numbers and those states have advanced political institutions. have not yet overcome the historical limits on international cooperation. 
